A simulative assessment of the Italian electoral system by Ortona, Guido et al.
 
Dipartimento di Politiche Pubbliche e Scelte Collettive – POLIS 






















































Department of Public Policy and Public Choice – Polis 
Università del Piemonte Orientale “Amedeo Avogadro” 
Via Cavour 84 – 15100 Alessandria - Italy 
Phone: +39 0131 283707 
            +39 0131 283715 
Fax :+39 0131 283704 
E-mail: guido.ortona@sp.unipmn.it 
                stefania.ottone@sp.unipmn.it 
                                                                 ferruccio.ponzano@sp.unipmn.it  2
Introduction 
 
From 1948 to 1992 members of both houses of the Italian Parliament were elected by 
proportional representation. Since 1993 a new electoral system has been adopted. Three quarters of 
the seats are elected by plurality voting in single member districts, while the remaining seats are 
filled by proportional representation. This choice was justified by the fact that in 44 years some 50 
governments were in office, on average for less than one year. The new electoral system was 
supposed to be the right tool to obtain more stable and long-lasting governments.  Unfortunately, 
this was not the case.  
   In section 1 we propose two simple indices we use to evaluate the goodness of an electoral 
system. In section 2 we apply them to the Parliaments elected both by the old (1992) and by the new 
(1994, 1996 and 2001) electoral system. Section 3 is devoted to some simulations based on electoral 
data from 1992 to 2001. The aim is to present some possible electoral results with different electoral 
systems. In section 4 we analyse the relevance of strategic voting, while section 5 is devoted to 
some forecasting about the next elections (2006). Conclusions are in section 6. 
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1. Representativeness and Governability 
The performance of a Parliament  affects a lot of features
1. Ideally, a criterion to choose the 
best electoral system should take account of all of them. However, there is a general agreement that 
the most relevant ones are actually two: representativeness (R) and  governability (G).  
Representativeness may be defined “the capacity to correctly represent the choices of the 
electors”. The parliament elected by pure proportionality in a nation-wide district may be assumed 
to be the most representative
2. When, under an electoral system, some parties obtain more seats than 
under the proportional rule, we have a loss of representativeness.  This allows to build a very 
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where: 
j = electoral system 
i = party 
n = number of parties 
Sj,i = number of seats obtained by party i under system j  
SPP,i = number of seats obtained by party i under perfect proportional rule 
ST = total number of seats in the House 
 




Governability may be defined “the capacity to effectively govern the State”. We assume that 
governability is inversely related to the number of parties in the governing coalition, and directly to 
the number of seats
4. The resulting index (gj) is: 
 
                                                 
1 See Ortona, 2000, for a sixteen-item, non exhaustive list. 
2 Actually, the representativeness of Parliaments elected by one-district pure proportionality may be different due to the 
"running costs". We will not deal with this topic here, as it concerns mostly inter-country comparisons.  
3 Note that the indices of proportionality  based on the difference between the share of votes and the share of seats, like Gallagher's, 
are not suitable to compare the representativeness of electoral systems, because the share of votes is affected by the electoral system. 
4 This assumption is in line with mainstream theory (for a discussion see f.i. Shugart and Wattenberg, 2001, ch.2). However, it has 
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where: 
m = majority 
Sj,m = number of seats obtained by the majority m under system j  
Pm = number of parties in the majority 
 
How is it possible to compare the performance of different systems? When a system results to 
be either dominant among a set of systems (i.e. it shows the highest levels of representativeness and 
governability) or dominated by one of them, there is no doubt. The former is the best system while 
the latter is ruled out. When there exists a trade-off between the two dimensions, we have to 
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where: 
A = constant term 
g = index of governability 
r = index of representativeness 
a = partial elasticity of the utility with respect to g 
b = partial elasticity of the utility with respect to r 
 
The relative importance of the two main dimension is represented by the ratio a/b
6. When its 
value is higher than 1, governability is assigned a higher weight than representativeness. When a/b 
is lower than 1, representativeness is the most relevant dimension. Obviously, the system with the 
highest value of U is the best one.  
The problem of choosing the best electoral system is reduced to that of choosing the value of 
a/b. The proof follows. 
                                                 
5 There are several reasons why a Cobb-Douglas  function is most suitable; they are illustrated in Fragnelli et al., 2006. 
6 Actually, the ratio of partial elasticities may be considered a proxy for the relative weight that the community assigns to relative 
increase in the value of g and r. See Fragnelli et al.  (2006) for a broader discussion.   5
Let's indicate, for simplicity, an electoral system X with small letters, and another one Y with 




b  we get u>U iff (g/G)
a>(R/r)
b, u>U iff (g/G)
a/b>(R/r),  and 
finally 
[1]      u>U iff a/b> Ln(R/r)/Ln(g/G) [if g>G; otherwise U<u. The case of g=G is trivial.] 
A major problem is how to determine the ratio a/b. A normative solution may be represented 
by a decision of the Supreme Court or someone else at a very high level. Alternatively, someone 
(but not the Parliament itself) may vote on its value. A positive solution may be obtained through an 
applied  analysis where the values of a  and b are chosen by the voters. An experiment and a further 
discussion is in Ortona (2005). 
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2. The Italian Parliament from 1992 to 2001 
In 1992 Italian citizens chose for the last time their Parliament by proportional representation 
(see Table 1 for the results). 
 
Table 1 – Chamber of Deputies in 1992 
Parties  Seats – Proportional system 
DC  206 
PDS  107 
PSI  92 
Lega lombarda  55 
Rif Comunista  35 
MSI  34 
PRI  27 
PLI  17 
PSDI  16 
Verdi  16 
la Rete  12 
Pannella  7 
Others  6 
 
In 1993 the electoral system was changed, to become a mixed system with 75% of seats  
elected by plurality and 25% by proportional representation. In the meanwhile, a big corruption 
scandal (Tangentopoli) changed the political scenario. The Democrazia Cristiana (DC) split into 
two parties: PPI and CCD. The Lega Lombarda became the Lega Nord, while the MSI changed its 
name into AN. A new right-wing party entered the political scene: Forza Italia.  
In 1994 the major coalition was the Polo (Polo della Libertà
7 in the north and Polo del Buon 
Governo
8 in the south). The results are in Table 2. 
 
                                                 
7 An alliance of Forza Italia with CCD and the Lega Nord. 
8 An alliance of Forza Italia with CCD and AN.   7
Table 2 – Chamber of Deputies in 1994 
 
Alliances Seats 
Polo  366 
Progressisti
9  213 
Patto per l’Italia
10  46 
SVP  3 
UV  1 
LAM  1 
 
 
In 1995 the center-right wing of the PPI left the party and formed the CDU. In 1996 the 
winning coalition was the Ulivo (PDS + PPI – SVP + Verdi + Rinnovamento Italiano). The results 
are in Table 3. 
 
Table 3 – Chamber of Deputies in 1996 
 
Alliances Seats 
Ulivo  287 
Polo per le libertà
11  246 
Lega Nord  59 
Rif. comunista  35 
UV  1 
LAM  1 




   In 1998, the less-extreme part of Rifondazione Comunista left the party and constituted the Partito 
dei Comunisti Italiani. Following other marginal secessions in different parties, UDR (UDEUR 
after few months), Democratici and SDI entered the political system. Before the elections of 2001, 
an alliance of PPI, Rinnovamento Italiano and other new left-wing forces resulted in a new party, 
La Margherita.  
In 2001, the winner was the Casa delle Libertà (Forza Italia + AN + UDC
12 + Lega Nord). 
The results are in Table 4. 
 
                                                 
9 PDS + Verdi + La Rete + Rifondazione Comunista + Alleanza Democratica. 
10 PPI + Patto Segni. 
11 Forza Italia + AN + CCD + CDU  
12 CCD + CDU   8
Table 4 – Chamber of Deputies in 2001 
 
Alliances Seats 
Casa delle libertà   368 
Ulivo
13  247 
Rif. comunista  11 
SVP  3 
UV  1 
 
 
The existence of a proportional share allows to apply our index of representativeness. As 
expected, the mixed system from 1994 to 2001 is always less representative than the proportional 
one in 1992 (see Table 5). However it performs quite well, mostly if one takes the high share of 
plurality seats into account. It is noticeable the absence of a negative trend: the adoption of   
plurality did not imply a tendency towards a reduction of the number of parties. 
 
Table 5 – Representativeness 
Year  r 
1992    0.96
14 
1994  0.83 
1996  0.89 
2001  0.87 
 
 
The index of governability was computed for the House where the Government had the lowest 
ratio between the number of seats in the majority (computed on  the basis of the vote of confidence) 
and the total number of seats. The Governments with the highest values are those lead by 
Berlusconi, while the lowest are those of D’Alema’s and Amato’s (II) leadership. However the 
values are generally low, and not that different, due to the high number of parties in the majority 
coalition. The figures are  in Table 6. 
 
                                                 
13 PDS + La Margherita + SDI + Verdi + Comunisti Italiani. 
14 The representativeness index in 1992 is lower than 1 due to the existence of many multi-member electoral districts instead of a 
single national district.    9
Table 6 – Governability 
Year Prime  Minister  Alliance  Seats  g 
1992 Amato  I  DC + PSI + PLI + 
PSDI  173*  0.135 
1993 Ciampi  DC + PSI + PLI + 
PSDI  309  0.123 
1994
15 Berlusconi  I 
Forza Italia + 
CCD + AN + 
Lega Nord 
159*  0.124 
1996 Prodi 
PDS + PPI – SVP 





322  0.102 
1998 D’Alema  I 
DS
16 + PPI – SVP 




+ UDR + SDI 
333  0.075 
1999 D’Alema  II 




+ UDEUR  
310  0.082 
2000 Amato  II 




+ UDEUR + SDI 
+ Rinnovamento 
Italiano 
319  0.063 
2001 Berlusconi  II 
Forza Italia + 
UDC + AN + 
Lega Nord 
175*  0.137 
2005 Berlusconi  III 
Forza Italia + 
UDC + AN + 
Lega Nord 
334  0.133 
* Seats in the Senate 
 
We may compare these governments by using the utility function (3). First of all, we obtain 
the best government for each  legislative term of office by ruling out the dominated governments. 
Amato I (1992), Berlusconi I (1994), Prodi (1996), Berlusconi II (2001) result to be the best. 
Secondly, we rule out the dominated governments among the best ones for each period. The final 
                                                 
15 In 1995 Mr. Dini formed a non-political government of technical experts. We do not consider this government because we cannot 
provide a good proxi of the number of parties that supported it. 
16 The former PDS   10
comparison is between Amato I and Berlusconi II. The citizens with a value of a/b equal to 6.7 are 
indifferent between the two governments. Those with a value of a/b  greater than 6.7 prefer 
Berlusconi II. Amato I is chosen when a/b is lower than 6.7. People who find Berlusconi II better 
than Amato I have a very strong preference for governability. Actually, they accept  up to a 6.7% 
decrease in representativeness in exchange for a 1% increase in governability. 
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3. The Italian Parliament from 1992 to 2001: some simulations with different 
electoral systems 
In the previous section we examined the goodness of the Parliaments and governments elected 
from 1992 to 2001 under the actual electoral system. The aim of this section is to simulate what 
would have happened under different electoral systems. In particular, on the basis of the recent 
debates about the choice between a proportional and a plurality system, we start from the real 
electoral data and we compare the mixed system both with the national pure proportional 
representation and with the plurality system. Under the mixed system the Chamber of Deputies is 
elected through two lists: a list for the seats voted by proportional representation and a list for the 
deputies chosen by the plurality system. We use the real votes obtained by the parties in the former 
to simulate the Parliament under the proportional system (with one nation-wide district) and the 
votes obtained in the latter to simulate the Parliament under the plurality system. The results of the 
simulations are in Table 7, 8 and 9. 
 
Table 7 – Chamber of Deputies in 1994 – simulations 
 
Seats  Parties 
Actual system  Proportional system  Plurality system 
Progressisti  213 203 218 
Polo   366 271 401 
Patto per l’Italia  46 99  5 
SVP  3 4 4 
UV  1 0 1 
LAM  1 1 1 
Others  0 52 0 
   12
Table 8 – Chamber of Deputies in 1996 – simulations  
 
Seats  Parties 
Actual system  Proportional system  Plurality system 
Ulivo  287 219 331 
Polo per le libertà  246 266 224 
Lega Nord  59 64 52 
Rif.comunista  35 54 20 
UV  1 0 1 
LAM  1 1 1 
Democrazia libertà  1 0 1 
Others  0 26 0 
 
 
Table 9 – Chamber of Deputies in 2001 – simulations  
 
Seats  Parties 
Actual system  Proportional system  Plurality system 
Casa delle libertà   368 313 374 
Ulivo  247 221 251 
Rif. comunista  11 31  0 
SVP  3 3 4 
UV  1 0 1 
Others  0 62 0 
 
In 1994 and 1996, the winning coalitions (Polo and Ulivo) would experience a relevant 
difference of seats if switching from the actual mixed system to one of the others. Patto per l’Italia 
and Rifondazione Comunista too would score significantly different results. At the same time, the 
difference of seats obtained by the main contenders of the winners (Progressisti and Polo) and by 
Lega Nord is quite limited.  
The scenario for 2001 is different. The presence of decoy lists (“liste civetta”) eliminates any 
relevant difference of seats between the mixed and the plurality system for the winners. Also, it is 
noticeable that in 1994 the actual majority would not have been such under proportionality. 
Moreover, in 1996 a single-party majority would have been possible under plurality (actually a 
single-coalition one), while in 2001 the system does not affect the composition of the majority. 
 
What is the best system? The indices of representativeness (Table 10) and governability 
(Table 11) allow to compare the three different systems for each year (the data for the actual system 
are in table 5 and 6). 
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Table 10– Representativeness 
 
Year Proportional  system Plurality  system 
1994  1 0.77 
1996  1 0.82 
2001  1 0.85 
 
Table 11 – Governability  
Year  Proportional system  Plurality System 
 Alliance  Seats  g  Alliance Seats  g 






















328 0.105  Casa delle 
libertà  374 0.148 
 
The straight application of criterion [1] to these data produces a relevant result: the mixed 
(actual) system is always dominated, as results from This means that, depending on the value of p, 
citizens prefer either the proportional representation or the plurality system. In particular: 
-  in 1994 the plurality system is preferred when a/b is greater than 0.68; 
-  in 1996 the plurality system is preferred when a/b is greater than 0.5 in the first alliance and 
as much as than 25.6 in the second (the real one); 
-  in 2001 the plurality system is preferred when a/b is greater than 0.47.  
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4. The Strategic Voting 
Strategic voting occurs when a voter does not vote her first preference, thinking that another 
one could get a better result. The most common situation where people find it profitable to 
implement the strategic voting is the plurality electoral system. A voter may decide to vote not for 
her first choice, but for a further one she hopes will be more likely to win.  
Since the Italian Chamber of Deputies is elected partially by proportional representation and 
partially by plurality, it is possible to check whether the Italian citizens chose the strategic voting to 
show their preferences in the plurality list. We analysed the data of the elections in 2001. This 
choice is due to the fact that we suppose that people need some time to “learn” how the system 
works and the consequences of their choice. 
The result obtained under the two different systems by the two big coalitions (Casa delle 
Libertà and Ulivo) and by two small parties (Lista Di Pietro and Democrazia Europea) that ran 
alone  are in Table 12.  
      15
Table 12 – Strategic voting     
 
  Lista Di Pietro  Democrazia 
Europea 
Casa delle Libertà  Ulivo 
  Prop. Plur.  Prop.  Plur.  Prop.  Plur.  Prop.  Plur. 
Piemonte 1  4.1% 5.3%  0.9%  1.3%  46.1%  42.6%  44.8%  49.2% 
Piemonte 2  4% 3% 1.7% 2.8%  54.5% 49.8%  35.5% 40% 
Lombardia 1  3.8% 5.4%  0.7%  0.8%  52.9%  52%  38.5%  41% 
Lombardia 2  4% 5.6% 1.6%  2.6%  59%  54.5%  30.4% 36.1% 
Lombardia 3  4% 4.3% 1.6%  2.3% 52.8%  49.1%  38.7% 42.5% 
Trentino 
Alto Adige  4% 4.3% 1.6%  -  31.9%  31%  60.5% 35.1% 
Veneto 1  4.5% 4.6%  2.2%  4%  56.3%  48%  31.4%  34.3% 




4.2% 4.9%  2.1%  2.9%  51.4%  47.8%  38.8%  41.6% 
Liguria  3.6% 3.3%  1.8%  1.4%  45.5%  43.9%  46.3%  50.5% 
Emilia 
Romagna  3.5% 3.4%  1.1%  1.7%  39.5%  37%  53.6%  56.8% 
Toscana  2.5% 2.4%  1%  1.6%  38.6%  36.6%  55.6%  57.4% 
Umbria  2.7% 3.1%  1.6%  0.9%  42.6%  41.4%  51.1%  53.4% 
Marche  3.7% 3.1%  1.5%  2.7%  44.8%  38.3%  47.3%  51.5% 
Lazio 1  2.5% 2.5%  1.7%  1.1%  48%  46.6%  44.8%  47.6% 
Lazio 2  3.7% 3.3%  3.3%  4.7%  57.2%  51.9%  34%  38.8% 
Abruzzi  6.3% 5.3%  1.9%  3.5%  50.6%  45.2%  38.2%  43.5% 
Molise  14.3% 15%  3.4%  11.2%  45.6%  35.8%  33.7%  36.2% 
Campania 1  3.8% 4.3%  2.4%  5.3%  52.2%  44.5%  39%  43.1% 
Campania 2  3.9% 3.5%  6.2%  8.6%  50.6%  42.6%  35.1%  41.3% 
Puglia  5.1% 4%  2.9%  6.1% 50.6%  45.1%  37.6% 41.3% 
Basilicata  5.2% 4.9%  6.6%  9.2%  37.1%  36.3%  48.2%  47.5% 
Calabria  3.6% 4.1%  4%  6.8%  49.8%  44.5%  39.4%  41.8% 
Sicilia 1  3.6% 3.1%  7.9%  9.2%  56%  50.7%  30.4%  35.5% 
Sicilia 2  4.1% 3.6%  6.3%  8.1%  56.5%  52.8%  30.9%  33.8% 
Sardegna  3.3% 3.4%  1.9%  1.5%  49.5%  45.2%  38.9%  43.4% 
Valle 
d’Aosta  -  -  - - -  -  - - 
 
 
Switching from the proportional to the plurality system the Ulivo is voted by a higher number 
of citizens. This is perfectly in line with the strategic voting; but the change is small, more so  if you 
consider that the contest was forecasted to be a close one. When we consider the votes received by 
the Casa delle Libertà, the result is even more striking: in all the districts the percentage of votes 
under the proportional system is higher than the percentage of votes under the plurality system. At 
the same time, small parties like Lista Di Pietro and Democrazia Europea are preferred on average 
by a higher number of citizens under the plurality system. A possible explanation is that the 
distance among the parties in the Casa delle Libertà is high enough to create a competition à la   16
Hotelling between the coalition and small parties (for instance, Democrazia Europea) that are close 
to the most central party of the coalition (UDC).  
To sum up, we cannot affirm that the strategic voting is implemented by the Italian voters. 
This is a remarkable results, as it undermines the main reason to move away from proportionality.    
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5. Forecasting 
What will be the political scenario in 2006? It is a difficult question. First, we do not know 
whether the future coalitions will further change. Second, we are not able to predict the reaction of 
the voters to the last political events. And finally, and most important, the return to proportionality 
is debated in the Parliament when these pages are written (October-November 2005), and likely to 
be adopted. 
However, we try and provide a forecasting of the next political elections, starting from two 
surveys: the Osservatorio del Nord Ovest’s survey (May 2004)
17 and the Repubblica - IPR’s survey 
(October 2005). The results are in Table 13 and 14; Ulivo is the center-left coalition, CDL ("Casa 
delle Libertà") the center-right one. 
 
Table 13 – Elections 2006 forecasting (Osservatorio del Nord Ovest’s survey) 
Parties Survey  Proportional  Plurality New 
Proportional 
 %  Seats 
Rifondazione 
Comunista  8.8%     
PDCI + Verdi  5.1%     
DS  16.9%     
SDI  1.1%     
Margherita  12.2%     
UDEUR  0.1%     
Lista Di Pietro  7%     
TOT.  ULIVO  51.3%  328 498 340 
Forza Italia  20.2%     
Lega Nord  5.6%     
Alleanza 
Nazionale  13.5%     
UDC  4.5%     
TOT.  CDL  43.8%  280 132 290 
Nuovo PSI 1.9% 12  0  0 
Radicali  1.6% 10  0  0 
MSI  0.3%  0 0 0 
Others  1%  0 0 0 
   r = 1  r = 0.73  r = 0.97 
   g = 0.074  g = 0.113  g = 0.077 
 
                                                 
17 We'd like to thank the director of the Osservatorio, prof. Luca Ricolfi, for his kind permission to use the data.   18
Table 14 – Elections 2006 forecasting (Repubblica - IPR’s survey) 
Parties Survey  Proportional  Plurality  New  Proportional
 %  Seats 
Rifondazione 
Comunista  6%     
PDCI + Verdi  4.5%       
DS  22%     
Margherita  12.5%     
Lista Di Pietro  1.5%     
UDEUR  2%     
SDI + Nuovo 
PSI  2.5%     
TOT. 
UNIONE  51% 322 450 340 
Forza Italia  18%     
Lega Nord  5.5%     
Alleanza 
Nazionale  12%     
UDC  5%     
Nuovo PSI De 
Michelis  1.5%     
Democrazia 
Cristiana  2%     
Alternativa 
Sociale  1.5%     
TOT.  CDL  45.5%  286 180 290 
Radicali  1.5% 9     
Others  2% 13     
   r = 1  r = 0.80  r = 0.97 
   g = 0.073  g = 0.102  g = 0.077 
 
We consider only the Lower Chamber, and three different electoral systems: the proportional 
representation, the plurality system and the new proportional system that will be probably voted by 
the Italian Parliament. This is a proportional representation where the winning coalition is entitled 
to a majority premium. The alliance that has been chosen by the plurality of the electors obtains the 
maximum number of seats between 340 (54% of the total number of seats) and the actual seats 
assigned by the proportional voting. In both surveys, the winner is the Unione (the center-left 
coalition).  
Also in this case we try and find out which is the best electoral system. The data from the 
Osservatorio del Nord Ovest’s survey suggest that: 
-  the plurality system is preferred when a/b > 0.745 
-  the pure proportional system is preferred when a/b < 0.745 
From the Repubblica - IPR’s survey, we find out that: 
-  the plurality system is preferred when a/b > 0.685   19
-  the new proportional system is preferred when 0.571 < a/b < 0.685 
-  the proportional system is preferred when  a/b < 0.571 
The most interesting result is that the new system may be the best one only under very 
restrictive conditions. Actually, it is such only when the government elected by the proportional 
system tends to be unstable (i.e., when the number of seats of the majority under the pure 
proportional representation is close to half of the seats in the Chamber of Deputies). In this case, the 
majority prize solve the problem by increasing the governability at an acceptable cost in terms of 
representativeness. But as the number of seats of the majority approaches 340, the (small) gain in 
governability is rapidly counterbalanced by the loss of representativeness. 
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5.  Conclusive remarks 
The results of the last section may appear somehow disappointing. The threshold values are so 
close that they do not allow to safely pinpoint the best electoral system. Actually, they are quite 
precious. They indicate that a choice criterion based on the trade-off between representativeness and 
governability is not that discriminating, at least for contemporary Italy. In a sense, it does not matter 
that much which system is actually chosen. One could object that the advantages of the plurality 
systems take some time to manifest, as voters must change their habits; but the data of section 4 
(and subsequent anecdotic evidence) suggest that some ten years is not enough for a trend into this 
direction to manifest. 
If  representativeness and governability cannot be used to individuate the best electoral 
system, we must resort to a further dimension. Which one? We suggest that, lexicographically,  the 
third most important one is the trust of the voters for the political aristocracy. Our feeling is that 
such trust is higher in proportional representation with open lists, as the political market is more 
contendible.
18  
This, obviously, is a matter for further research. Another one is the following. Why voters did 
take advantage only to a very limited extent of the possibility of reducing the redundancy  of the 
parties offered by the electoral reform of 1993?  Possibly they were too strongly linked to 
traditional fidelities. But possibly they shared instead the opinion of Lijphart (1999) that the 
advantages of plurality are at most very dubious, and "voted with their votes" against the electoral 
reform.  Putting the argument the other way round, the behavior of Italian voters  provide some 




                                                 
18 Possibly this is why this hypothesis has not been considered by any party in the current debate on the electoral 
reform.   21
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